Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War

Roper (2009:106) concludes that a change in the lexicon is an important weapon in the War on Terror:

The United States needs to refocus its efforts and resources to more effectively deal with the current global threat. Clear thinking supported by clear language will assist in this endeavor. American policy should focus more on denying support for those organizations with political goals inimical to US interests, rather than emphasizing the apprehension of individual terrorists. Removing the “war on terrorism” from the official lexicon and replacing it with more precise and descriptive terms such as “war on global hirabahist insurgency” or “global counterinsurgency” would be an important step in identifying the real nature of the enemy, the security challenges posed, and the array of techniques the enemy may employ. More importantly, the change in descriptor will help focus the intellectual framework required to develop a successful US strategy for dealing with this complex and lethal problem.

Emphasis Mine

Roper's main points are that terrorism is a tactic, and that insurgency and terrorism may overlap but are not the same thing. "Understanding terrorism as an activity subsumed under a wide variety of activities employed by an insurgent movement provides the intellectual clarity required to identify the real enemy and formulate effective countermeasures. It is, therefore, inaccurate to semantically equate terrorism and insurgency." (Roper:2009,97)

Roper (2009:94-95) gives several definitions of terrorism but they all have the same assumption: violence by governments is legitimate while violence by non-government forces is not. Indeed, government terrorism is often described as an "... overreaction ... from target governments" (Roper:2009,p.97).

Roper (2009:98) contend that counter-insurgency strategies designed to suppress Communists is inappropiate for this new type of insurgency.

Classic counterinsurgency theory tends to assume a binary struggle between insurgent and counterinsurgent, yet insurgencies today may incorporate many diffuse, competing insurgent movements. In contrast to revolutionary war theory, these conflicts often lack a “united front.” Likewise, classic insurgency theory typically regards insurgency as between an internal nonstate actor and a single government. Today, however, there is real-time informal cooperation and cross-pollination between insurgents in many countries, often accomplished without a central controlling authority. The National Security Strategy of the United States describes terrorist networks as being more decentralized than traditional terrorist organizations; less dependent upon a central command structure; and more reliant upon inspiration from a common ideology. Although parallels—such as the need for contextually specific solutions—exist with the ideologically motivated Communist insurgencies of the mid- to late twentieth century, the franchise-like character of modern transnational insurgencies fueled by religious fanaticism is new.

Emphasis Mine

In this, Roper is wrong. A counter-example is the Irish resistance to the English occupation. The resistance was world-wide from support in the USA, Australia, Argentina, Canada, France, etc. A notable action against English tyranny took place at Vinegar Hill in 1804. A driving force of the international resistance was religion, and this has been going for 500 years.

Roper (2009:101-102) posits that the correct strategy is to:

The US strategic goal in the Long War is to preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on the rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism, and create a global environment inhospitable to extremists. American strategy to achieve this goal is based on an international effort to deny terrorists resources. This strategy is comprised of three elements: protect the homeland; disrupt and attack terrorist networks; and counter ideological support for terrorism. Protecting the homeland is the defensive aspect of the strategy, but defense in and of itself is not enough. A successful strategy requires attacking the terrorists and their ability to operate, to include their leadership, funding, and communications. The most important component of the strategy is countering ideological support for terrorism—the “decisive effort.” It should be self-evident that countering ideological support for those who commit terrorist acts is as much a social, societal, and psychological issue as it is a physical one.

Emphasis Mine

The fundamental problem is that the American Government is a terrorist organisation itself. Everything it does is in furtherence of grabbing resources of the third world for its own benefit. Even its vaunted "Shock and Awe" campaign of 2003 was a classic case of terrorism - sheer brutality to achieve political acquiesence. It supports a terrorist government: Israel.

The gulf between the words of the US government and its actions are an abyss into which the US Army has cast itself. Every action by the US Military in Iraq and Afghanistan is terrorism against the local people. The US Military has become the biggest recruiter for the resistence. How can the US Army defeat itself?

Another underlying assumption of the article is that legimate governments are those who serve the interests of the USA. There is no self-determination in the US's view of the world. Everyone exists to serve the USA.

The very success of the USA economy means that the USA must be an empire that rules through terror. And this terror begets terror. In order to win the long war, the USA must destroy itself. Therein lies the danger for the rest of us.

References

Roper, Daniel S. (2009), "Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War", Parameters, Autumn 2008, pp. 92-108 (Viewed 22 February 2009)