The Moral Equality of Combatants

Carl Ceulemans investigates the The Moral Equality of Combatants in PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly - Winter 2007-08 (pp. 99-109). I think his main conclusion is to justify continuing the war in Iraq and Afghanistan even though going to war (ad bellum) may have been injust, continuing action in the war (in bellum) is just. There is no fruit of the poisoned tree logic here. He just says the ordinary participants are only morally culpable in bellum.

The question of moral equality is whether all participants in a war equally culpable without regard to their own conduct. In any war, one side must be engaged in an unjust war. The question posed here is whether all participants of that side are morally culpable. Participants from the other side become morally culpable if their conduct is. The justness of the cause does not exculpate them.

His conclusion is:

Can combatants ever be blamed for unjust wars in which they participate? This question reflects the complexity of the moral duality of war. Philosophers such as Walzer and Christopher argue that soldiers can never be held responsible for the justice of the war. The war in which they participate is not their war, but is, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau remarked, a relationship between the political entities to which they belong.¹⁹ Combatants are, in this view, moral equals. Others will argue against this traditional position. For those like McMahan, combatants cannot escape the moral consequences of their participation in an unjust war. His view is straightforward: Those who fight in a just war are just combatants, while those who fight in a war that is unjust are unjust combatants.²⁰ For that reason alone they cannot be moral equals.

This article did not go quite that far in determining a combatant’s responsibility. It was argued that soldiers only become unjust combatants when they are aware of their involvement in the illegitimate activity associated with an unjust war. There is little doubt when dealing with regimes that blatantly lack any form of political legitimacy as to the justice of the war. The fact is that all such regime’s wars are unjust, and those who willingly participate cannot escape responsibility. However, blaming soldiers who fight in an unjust war that was initiated by a legitimate government raises a number of issues. Except for those who may have knowledge of the ad bellum decisionmaking process, it is not reasonable to assume an ad bellum responsibility for the military members conducting the conflict. It may well be argued that the principle of the moral equality of combatants is presumptively correct. In other words, the moral equality of combatants is not an absolute but rather a prima facie position. Based on this line of reasoning, questioning the moral equality of the soldier on the ground is much harder than alluding to the complicity of senior leaders.

pp. 108-109

Emphasis Mine

This conclusion is just a cop-out: individuals are responsible for their actions. we cannot devolve responsibility to others unless there are extenuating circumstances.

War involves the commission of an evil act: killing human beings. The commission of this evil comes at a cost for the victim, the perpetrators, and bystanders. The survivors are morally degraded because they cannot repudiate the act and punish the offenders.

The only counter to this moral degradation is the compensation gained moral enhancement: a greater good has been achieved. This evil was done so that good can prevail, and there was no other way to achieve this.

Just War theory seeks to assure the participants that they are doing a morally repugnant act for ethical reasons. Thus, all participants are not morally equal. I am in agreement with McMahan in this.

Earlier in the article, the author considers the scenario where the military is completely isolated from the rest of society:

In reality such a scenario is not very likely. No unjust regime is so powerful or inventive that it can hide its true nature all of the time. Of course, there will inevitably be citizens who will turn a blind eye when confronted with a regime’s immoral policies. These individuals pretend not to notice or care. There are several explanations for this attitude of denial. There is the fear of becoming one of the regime’s victims, the anxiety associated with losing certain advantages (power, wealth, opportunities, and positions). There is no reason to believe that members of the military would be immune to this kind of logic. It goes without saying that those who are unable to invoke invincible ignorance cannot escape their military ad bellum responsibility. We have already examined the case of military members acting under severe duress. Those who turn a blind eye out of fear of losing their privileges also revert to the status of unjust combatants. They knowingly—although they may pretend otherwise—contribute to the continuing existence of an immoral regime by their participation in its unjust war.

pp. 104-105

Emphasis Mine

I would think that many citizens of both Australia and USA fall into this category. They are showing wilful ignorance because it is their material advantage to do.

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My locals are really bunging it on

Mr. Warren Heggarty complains that My locals are really bunging it on. The bombing campaign by the local louts has raised his hackles. He fears that Totalitarianism may be the only answer.

He concludes

There are very good ethical reasons why one should live by an ethical code, even if it is essentially unenforceable. But the recent popularity of explosives during a period of government-induced paranoia tells me that humans do not care about these reasons.

I fear that Thomas Hobbes was right: if left to their own devices, people will choose to drive too fast, copulate randomly, take drugs and eat. Any time left would be devoted to letting off explosives.

Hobbes's solution was to raise over the people an all-powerful Totalitarian Authority to coerce them into more socially responsible behaviour. The fact that random breath testing halved the road death toll suggests that his theory is on the money.

Still, it would be sad indeed if our free society had to be scrapped in favour of a New Totalitarianism simply because no one gives a rat-a-tat-tat about anyone but themselves.

Emphasis Mine

I think that the lure of Fascism is that discipline is imposed on others and decisions are made by others. As the author says, this is an attractive option.

This is reflected in people's work in which they are given tightly written scripts to follow with very little chance of individual initiative. And even in education, the students are given the answers to regurgitate at examinations. There is no need to think at all - just follow the process. Don't question - only obey.

The author does prefer the ethical approach to discipline. But this requires one to take responsibility for educating oneself in ethics and practising it daily. This is not easy in an economic system that rewards monetary profit over correct action.

And this is a major reason that Communism is so difficult to obtain. The whole society must continually strive to be more ethical and responsible.

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Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991

I have just finished reading Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (2002, University of Nebraska) By Kenneth M. Pollack. His conclusions were that the competence of the lower ranks of the officer corps, and the technical abilities of the troops were the deciding factors in determining the effectiveness of the Arab armies.

The author concludes:

The history of the Arabs in combat since 1945 also provides some interesting lessons regarding the importance of good generalship as opposed to proficient tactical forces. No one can dispute the influence of generalship on war. The performances of Napoleon, Frederick, Hannibal, and countless other "great captains” attest to what military genius can accomplish. However, tactical proficiency is also an important consideration in a nation's military fortunes. The German Wehrmacht demonstrated throughout the Second World War that superb tactical formations can mitigate the damage wrought by strategic mistakes and at times even allow an army to prevail despite bad generalship. By contrast, the history of the modern Arab armed forces demonstrates that even superb strategic moves may amount to nothing if the nation's tactical formations are incapable of executing them. The Arabs assembled at least two highly competent command staffs: the Egyptian General Staff and senior generals of 1967—73 and the Iraqi General Staff and senior generals of 1986—91. Nevertheless, the achievements of both groups of generals was ultimately very modest in military terms (although quite far reaching in political terms) because of the severely limited capabilities of the tactical formations at their command. One can only wonder what Egypt's Isma'il 'Ali or Iraq's Husayn Rashid—or at lower levels of command, the Jordanian Rakan al-Jazi or the Syrian Hasan at-Turkmani—might have been able to accomplish had they commanded forces with the proficiency of the Wehrmacht or the IDF.

Thus, the history of the Arab armies puts the lie to the contentions of some that there exist strategies so brilliant that they transcend all other liabilities and put the enemy at such a disadvantage that victory is assured. The incompetence of Arab tactical leadership, their severe problems managing information, and the inability of their personnel to properly employ and maintain their military hardware left the Arab states highly vulnerable to most potential adversaries. These extreme limitations of tactical capabilities greatly curtailed the options available to their strategic leadership and badly limited the ability of these nations to employ military force in pursuit of political objectives. Generals of adequate competence had little prospect of successfully achieving any political goal, and even exceptionally competent Arab strategic leaders were able to achieve only the most modest results. Indeed, what is so intriguing about the two greatest Arab triumphs of the last fifty years—Egypt's crossing of the Suez in the October War and the Iraqi victory at the end of the Iran-Iraq War—are the circumstances that allowed Egypt and Iraq to reap such sweeping political gains from such modest military achievements.

pp. 581-582

Emphasis Mine

I have two (2) reactions to this: the myth of the CEO; and the importance of the economic and political development of the individual.

By the myth of the CEO, I mean the idea that a CEO with the right strategy can turn an organisation around. The author is of the opinion that this cannot be done without the competence and leadership at the lower levels. I agree.

With regards to the economic and political development of the individual, I mean the confidence of an individual that they are able to make and decisions in line with the general direction of an economic plan, and a political policy. The more an individual is able to indentify with the economic and plotical system, the more able they are to make competent and timely decisions.

Indeed, the development of Israeli society has been far superior than Arab ones because the Israeli economic development has been a combination of Capitalism and Socialism, and the political development has been that of a Democracy.

Whereas the Arab economic development has been a combination of a Feudal and Command economy, and their political development has been either Dictatorship or Absolute Monarchies.

Once again, a superior political and economic system will beat the crap out of an inferior one.

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Angry city has a very troubled heart

Christopher Bantick concludes his description about an Angry city has a very troubled heart with the observation that:

What kind of society is it that produces that kind of anger, visited on people going about their business?

What kind of society is it where anger management courses are burgeoning in suburban recreation halls?

Road rage, spouse rage, train rage, age rage against the elderly, trolley rage in supermarkets and bread rage in a bakery, says something about the level of intolerance prompting anger.

The philosophy is simple: we matter, others don't. It's mindless selfishness.

There is a worrying angry ugliness in Melbourne's troubled heart.

No longer are mean, shadowy streets just in the city. They run between manicured suburban nature strips.

Bullies leave school, then drive cars, travel in packs on trains, hang out in hotel car parks and visit bakeries.

Emphasis Mine

In another angry city, we see two people casually walking away from someone who was Punched and robbed for his mobile telephone.

Meanwhile, James Howard Kunstler is ever cheerful for his Forecast for 2008:

In any case, whoever ends up in the oval office will preside over one king-hell of a clusterfuck. In the immortal words of TV's erstwhile "Mr. T," I pity da fool who gets elected into this mess. There will be a whole continent full of bankrupt, re-poed, and idle former WalMart shoppers, many of them with half of their skin tattooed and many of that bunch all revved up to "roll heavy and gun up" against the folks who screwed them.

I would suggest that practising non-violence is going to have to be a survival tactic.

I have been on buses where youths have tried to knife each other. I have been on trains where people almost came to blows.

The immediate cause is some fatuous remark which the "innocent" victim was too proud to apologise for. People would rather die than admit that they were wrong.

Some people think they can treat others as dirt and expect to escape unharmed.

I sense the anger and frustration every time I take public transport. I well understand why the train station keeps getting burnt down.

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Masters Mastered

I have finally satisfied the requirements for attainment of my Master's degree. Four (4) years of being bored out of my brain by lecturers who get paid piece rate for every student they keep until the census date. University is just a factory for producing bits of paper with fancy writing on it.

There were lecturers who still cared about the students enough to push them to be their best. These were members of the NTEU. I suppose if you cared enough to join a union, you cared enough about the quality of your work, and work to inspire others to care.

At the university I went to, there was one class that when I turned up, one of the students asked me if I was the lecturer because I was the only white person there. The rest of the class were either Chinese or Indians. And white Australians wonder why IT jobs are going overseas: because that is where the qualified people are!

And do I regret doing the degree? Yes and No. Yes because it tended to be a TAFE course geared to practical experience of computing. No because there were the hold-outs for a true university education.

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