Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991

I have just finished reading Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (2002, University of Nebraska) By Kenneth M. Pollack. His conclusions were that the competence of the lower ranks of the officer corps, and the technical abilities of the troops were the deciding factors in determining the effectiveness of the Arab armies.

The author concludes:

The history of the Arabs in combat since 1945 also provides some interesting lessons regarding the importance of good generalship as opposed to proficient tactical forces. No one can dispute the influence of generalship on war. The performances of Napoleon, Frederick, Hannibal, and countless other "great captains” attest to what military genius can accomplish. However, tactical proficiency is also an important consideration in a nation's military fortunes. The German Wehrmacht demonstrated throughout the Second World War that superb tactical formations can mitigate the damage wrought by strategic mistakes and at times even allow an army to prevail despite bad generalship. By contrast, the history of the modern Arab armed forces demonstrates that even superb strategic moves may amount to nothing if the nation's tactical formations are incapable of executing them. The Arabs assembled at least two highly competent command staffs: the Egyptian General Staff and senior generals of 1967—73 and the Iraqi General Staff and senior generals of 1986—91. Nevertheless, the achievements of both groups of generals was ultimately very modest in military terms (although quite far reaching in political terms) because of the severely limited capabilities of the tactical formations at their command. One can only wonder what Egypt's Isma'il 'Ali or Iraq's Husayn Rashid—or at lower levels of command, the Jordanian Rakan al-Jazi or the Syrian Hasan at-Turkmani—might have been able to accomplish had they commanded forces with the proficiency of the Wehrmacht or the IDF.

Thus, the history of the Arab armies puts the lie to the contentions of some that there exist strategies so brilliant that they transcend all other liabilities and put the enemy at such a disadvantage that victory is assured. The incompetence of Arab tactical leadership, their severe problems managing information, and the inability of their personnel to properly employ and maintain their military hardware left the Arab states highly vulnerable to most potential adversaries. These extreme limitations of tactical capabilities greatly curtailed the options available to their strategic leadership and badly limited the ability of these nations to employ military force in pursuit of political objectives. Generals of adequate competence had little prospect of successfully achieving any political goal, and even exceptionally competent Arab strategic leaders were able to achieve only the most modest results. Indeed, what is so intriguing about the two greatest Arab triumphs of the last fifty years—Egypt's crossing of the Suez in the October War and the Iraqi victory at the end of the Iran-Iraq War—are the circumstances that allowed Egypt and Iraq to reap such sweeping political gains from such modest military achievements.

pp. 581-582

Emphasis Mine

I have two (2) reactions to this: the myth of the CEO; and the importance of the economic and political development of the individual.

By the myth of the CEO, I mean the idea that a CEO with the right strategy can turn an organisation around. The author is of the opinion that this cannot be done without the competence and leadership at the lower levels. I agree.

With regards to the economic and political development of the individual, I mean the confidence of an individual that they are able to make and decisions in line with the general direction of an economic plan, and a political policy. The more an individual is able to indentify with the economic and plotical system, the more able they are to make competent and timely decisions.

Indeed, the development of Israeli society has been far superior than Arab ones because the Israeli economic development has been a combination of Capitalism and Socialism, and the political development has been that of a Democracy.

Whereas the Arab economic development has been a combination of a Feudal and Command economy, and their political development has been either Dictatorship or Absolute Monarchies.

Once again, a superior political and economic system will beat the crap out of an inferior one.