Showing posts with label Rosenstrasse. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rosenstrasse. Show all posts

2013/01/02

Is mathbabe a terrorist or a lazy hippy? (#OWS)

Cathy O'Neil asks if Is mathbabe a terrorist or a lazy hippy? (#OWS).

O'Neil contends that the Occupy Movement is “scary” because;

It’s our ideas that threaten, not our violence. We ignore the rules, when they oppress and when they make no sense and when they serve to entrench an already entrenched elite. And ignoring rules is sometimes more threatening than breaking them.

This setting aside of rules was part the ethos of the Occupy Movement which O'Neil says were:

  • that we must overcome or even ignore structured and rigid rules to help one another at a human level,
  • that we must connect directly with suffering and organically respond to it as we each know how to, depending on circumstances, and
  • that moral and ethical responsibilities are just plain more important than rules.

It is interesting that the State had to respond with violence against the Occupy Movement. The system had run out of ideas to counter the movement. And, yet, this is not the first time the State has done this:

  • The Civil Rights Movement (see Deacons for Defense).
  • The Anti-War Movement of the 1960's and 1970's
  • Rachel Corrie

In 2005, I had posted a table about four (4) non-violent protests with their outcomes in Trucker Blockades - One Day On. The interesting one for me has always been the Rosenstrasse protests which succeeded against the Nazi regime. But that protest was not a clash of ideas. The regime could live with the outcome.

The ideas raised by the Occupy Movement threaten the Capitalist system. Other ideas in the past did the same when the social conservatives sought to maintain the status quo. The Unhappy Marriage of Capitalism and Conservatism reflected on the tension between the political and economic forces within the Capitalist elite. In many times in the past, Capitalism has successfully absorbed these new progressive forces after trying to violently supress them.


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2005/09/24

Trucker Blockades - One Day On

One day later and the trucker protests have disappeared from public view. The Ministry of Truth could not have done a better job.

In Buddhist Protests in Vietnam 1963, I had constructed a table comparing two non-violent protests (Buddhist and Rosenstrasse). The following table is an updated version with my subjective assessments of Rachel Corrie and the recent Trucker Blockade.

MetricRosenstrasseBuddhistRachel CorrieTrucker Blockade
Year1943196320032005
Number of protesters600 at any one time. 6,000 involved.Unknown. In the thousands.One (1)Probably dozens
Length of the protestA weekMay to AugustSeveral days8 to 10 hours
Were the protestors were seen as being capable of causing social unrestYesYesNoYes
Reputation of the regimeThe reputation of the Nazi regime had suffered because of a military disaster (Stalingrad)The Diem government was very unpopular with the people over its repressive tactics.Two-thirds of Israelis probably supported the governmentThe Howard government is in good shape. There are no serious challenges.
What were the protestors' aims?They were simple and straightforward: Give us our husbands backGeneral and vague. They were against the various policies of the Diem government.Stop the demolition of a Palestinian house.Relief against rising fuel costs
Did the protestors expand their demands to overthrow the regime?NoNo, but the government saw them as challenging it.NoNo
Was the regime leadership was divided over this issue?YesYesNoNo
Number of casualitiesNoneTen (10) dead by suicide
1,400+ arrested and placed in concentration camps
Unknown number were wounded and missing
One (1) murdered.None
Did protest achieve its aims?Yes. Their husbands were all released.Yes. The Diem government was overthrown on 1 November 1963 in a military coup and the prisoners were released with proclamation of religious freedom.NoNo


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2005/07/20

Seeds of Violence

On p. 41 of Annals Australasia (June 2005), Alexander Cockburn is quoted from his article, From Howard Unruh to John Muhammad [Cached version from Google - The original article was unreachable when I tried to get to it]:

[Doug] Saunders [journalist for Toronto's Globe and Mail] quotes David Grossman, a former US military psychologist who helped develop programs to make new recruits more effective killers, to increase what's called the "trigger-pull ratio." These programs are now part of basic training. Grossman says that the trick is to break down the natural human aversion to killing. He calls this "disengagement." Once this aversion has been removed, it never comes back, and can make it easier for former soldiers to become murderers. "The ability to watch a human being's head explode and to do it again and again-that takes a kind of desensitization to human suffering that has to be learned," Grossman said.

So don't blame Charlton Heston. The US military is the chief sponsor of violence in this country. One day in 1949 Howard Unruh, a 28-year-old World War II veteran, shot thirteen of his New Jersey neighbors. His famous line was, "I'd have killed a thousand if I'd had enough bullets." His military firearms training made his "walk of death" the first modern serial-killer case.

From Unruh to [convicted Beltway Sniper John] Muhammad. Millions have been molded in this manner. Blowback is the consequence. It will be with us as long as the Empire needs war as its guarantor. America is living in the blowback years. What goes around comes around, with unforeseen consequences, or consequences foreseen but discounted. Unleash the mujahedeen on the Soviets in Afghanistan, and you get Osama bin Laden.

Blowback usually comes as a shock, because the art of politics is to separate actions from consequences.

Emphasis Mine

David Grossman apparently runs Killology Research Group. One book he has written is called On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. I have not read this book but I find that it is cited in many studies that appear to be against violence.

The quote from Alexander Cockburn implies that governments are actively seeking to make soldiers more ready to kill and this is putting more killers onto the streets. He is implying that the governments are, in effect, responsible for some of the serial killers out there.

But being mindful of what Pat wrote in Freedom is all in the mind about individual responsibility, I think that you would have to have to know what choices an individual thinks they have before judging their decision. Witness the build-up to the latest war in Iraq: we were presented with the choice of doing nothing and being nuked, or attacking Iraq to disarm Saddam of his WMD. Given that choice, no wonder many people opted for war.

In The Effects of Violence on Perpetrators (Peace Review, Mar2002, Vol. 14 Issue 1, p67), Rachel M. MacNair writes:

A related question is the psychological reaction of killing at the time that someone does the act—that is to say, the acute reaction at the time as opposed to the chronic reaction long afterward. At the time of the trauma itself, there are two features that have been shown in victims and rescuers to make the development of PTSD symptoms more likely in the future, and further research may show this to be the case when an act of killing is the trauma. One is distancing or avoidance at the time, which of course is often necessary to allow the violence to be done at all. One might think it would help avert later problems, but it does not seem to have that effect. The other is a sense of dissociation and time distortion—a sense of unreality, that things are happening as if in a dream or with the mind separated from the body. Time can often seem to slow down during the event. This was portrayed during battle scenes in the film Saving Private Ryan with sudden silence and slowness in the midst of battle. This has also been noted several times by those carrying out executions, even though these events were scheduled well in advance and would therefore involve more mental preparation.

Another psychological phenomenon at the time of killing seems paradoxical, but has been often noted: a sense of exhilaration that goes with the act of killing. This may be where the idea of being "bloodthirsty" comes from. Some researchers have proposed ideas, in the case of victims of trauma, about how this may be biological, involving opioids generated by the brain at times of intense stress. But this has not yet been studied enough even in victims to say what the cause is. Nor do we yet know if those who have this reaction are more prone to PTSD than those who do not. It does seem likely from interviews that this peritraumatic exhilaration at least does not protect those who have it from PTSD symptoms. That is why even a sense of euphoria, which is normally a desirable thing, does not keep the act of killing from being classified as a trauma.

The concept of "addiction to trauma" has so far been suggested primarily for those victims who continually seek out situations in which they are revictimized. Anecdotal instances of euphoria associated with killing are numerous enough to justify further inquiry. At this stage in our knowledge, it can only be accounted for as speculation, or as a hypothesis in need of testing. If there is a biological or habit-formed basis for committing violence as an addictive behavior, then of course the importance of learning about this for violence prevention purposes is obvious.

Emphasis Mine

(Rachel M. MacNair is the Director at the Institute for Integrated Social Analysis. With a bachelor’s degree in peace and conflict studies from Earlham College, she received a Ph.D. in psychology in order to pursue research in perpetration-induced traumatic stress.)

I think we come back what I think is a fundamental flaw in pacifism (Pacifism in Action) wherein the forces deployed by governments are not "decent human beings" but as people who are selected to do violence and are further desensitised to lower the threshold to committing violence. However, the threshold is not always crossed: it was in the case of Rachel Corrie but not in the Rosenstrasse Protest.

The problem then for protestors is how far can you go with your demands? If you go too far with demands, then there is a violent reaction from the forces of the state. Gerry's solution appears to be to use protestors as cannon fodder in he disrespects more peaceful ways...:

One of the strongest weapons of pacifism is that of public opinion. The more pacifists get killed or mistreated, the more the tide of public opinion swings away from the oppressors/aggressors and towards the pacifists' resistance.

As the current war in Iraq shows, public opinion accounts for very little indeed. Opinion poll after opinion poll shows minority support for the war but only one government has lost an election over the war: Spain's. Possibly 100,000 civilians are dead and the slaughther goes on. Public opinion is outraged. But so what if it is? John W. Howard is still PM and looks like staying on for a long time yet.

Yet, John Howard was dragged screaming into sending troops to protect the East Timorese in 1999. Why the difference? The answer appears to be that there was far more activity over that issue than over Iraq: there were strikes, continuing protests, e-mail campaigns, etc. With Iraq, we showed up for one day and went home.


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2005/07/03

Buddhist Protests in Vietnam 1963

Maj. Gen. Tran Van-Don writes in Our Endless War: Inside Vietnam (Presido Press, USA:1978), on pp.69-72,:

But, of all errors perpetrated by the Ngo family, the most serious were those pertaining to the Buddhists. This was reported widely by the press, both in Vietnam and abroad.

Considering our tradition of tolerance in religious belief, the abuses perpetrated by the Ngo family are that much more difficult to understand. This adventure in which they were recklessly involved was loaded with risks and possible repercussions. They were attacking a religious group that comprised about 80 percent of the population of the country.

The Buddhists' feelings of distress did not come from problems they were having with their Catholic neighbors. Instead, Buddhist leaders began to get more and more upset about the various injustices perpetrated by the Diem regime on all the people of South Vietnam. Younger Buddhist bonzes picked up the struggle against all forms of oppression and injustice and many malcontents were attracted to militant bonzes like the Venerable Thich Tri Quang. They saw the Buddhist confessional organization as a force capable of resisting government pressures and suddenly the Buddhist faith became a political ally of those anti-Communists who opposed policies of the Diem government. They were able to convert thousands of people who formerly were mild Buddhists or simply sympathetic to that religion. Considerable moral as well as financial support accrued to the Institute of Teaching of the Buddhist Doctrine and to the pagodas, which became centers of resistance against government policy. Various disparate elements rallied to the Buddhist cause: high-school and college youths, professional men, members of the press, disappointed politicians, and parliamentarians belonging to the opposition parties.

As with many struggles, a single simple event brought the Buddhist crisis to the attention of the whole world. This had to do with flying of the Buddhist flag. A presidental decree, issued in April 1963, specified that on the occasion of religious holidays the national flag must be hoisted above any religious material displayed.

The first such event occurring after this decree was the pompous celebration organized for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the espicopal ordination of Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc, brother of the president. During this ceremony the papal flag was displayed along with the national banner. About one month later the Buddhists celebrated the aniiversary of Buddha's birth. The bonzes decided not to fly their flag in the same way that the Catholics had for Thuc's anniversary, and thus adorned their pagados and homes with Buddhist flags alone.

In the city of Hue, the deputy province chief ordered them to display the national flag above their multicolored Buddhist banner. They refused and to show their solidarity on the principle, they gathered in the streets for a demonstration. The assistant chief of the province, a fervent Catholic, interpreted this attitude as a challenge to the government. Acting under the advice of Archbishop Thuc, he ordered the police and the army to disperse the demonstrators, forcefully if necessary. The operation led to a tragedy, with nine dead and fourteen hospitalized.

There are false versions of the incident. The government, through Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, attributed this disaster to the explosion of a grenade thrown inside the crowd by the Communists. This was palpably untrue since there were many eye-witnesses and foreign press reporters on hand who took photographs during the entire demonstration.

Despite its sinister aspect, even this issue could have been solved without too much difficulty had not Ngo Dinh Diem adopted an unbending and obstinate posture toward the Buddhists. Since the government offered no real appeasements, Buddhist protests multiplied everywhere. A demonstration organized in Hue on June 3 by various student groups was broken up by police shooting gas grenades. Some sixty-seven people were badly injured in the ensuring fracas. On June 11, an old bonze, the Venerable Thich Quang Duc, sat down in a public street intersection in Saigon, sprinkled his body and clothes with gasoline, and set himself on fire. He died without crying or moving, making the populace react toward him as a martyr. As the imtemperate remarks of "barbecue," by Madame Nhu were reported, this suicide aroused general indignation both in Vietnam and abroad.

To reverse this antigovernment feeling, a joint communique was agreed to by President Diem and the high Buddhist pontiff, Thich Tinh Khiet. This conciliatory steo, however, was immediately overcome by the public accusation of Mt. and Mrs. Nhu that Communists had infiltrated the Buddhist movement and by other derogatory accusations.

Buddhist leaders began hunger strikes and nine other flaming suicides occurred by both male and female bonzes in Saigon and other communities. These further inflamed the local people and brought severe criticism on the government from abroad.

On July 15, the American ambassador, Frederick Nolting, suggested to Diem that he make a radio announcement granting concessions to the Buddhists. Diem simply ignored him. On July 16, I went to see Diem, since I was going to make a trip to Hue myself. I tried to make him understand that the situation in Hue was getting worse through the repressive measures undertaken by the police and army units commandered by Colonel Do Cao Tri, the new commander of the First Division. This highly efficient officer, one of our best military leaders, executed his orders with truly excessive zeal, even using dogs to chase the demonstrators.

In Hue, I found that the pagoda Tu Dam, seat of the Buddhist movement, had been encircled and deprived of water and supplies for several days. The Buddhist people in Hue, however, did their best to help the bonzes who have been cut off from all contact with the outside world, this at the risk of their own lives. I intervened as best I could to alleviate the situation.

Seeing at first hand the suffering of the poor people in the pagoda, I went to see Do Cao Tri and appealed to him as military governor of Hue to relax the oppressive policy which was literally starving the Buddhists. I told him, as Diem's personal envoy, that he had gone too far in using dogs against the demonstrators and in cutting off food to the pagoda. After our conversation, he reversed his policy and allowed food and water to be provided them and opened up the barbed wire encirclind the pagoda.

Returning to Saigon on July 17, I reported to the president what I had seen and heard in Hue. I informed him that the people were very surprised at his total silence since May 8. They could not understand his indifferent attitude since he had always been most solicitous of Hue, his home town. I suggested that he make an announcement, in the language of Hue, worded in the most appeasing manner possible. Ngo Dinh Nhu supported my suggestion by telling Diem that his assistant, Cao Xuan Vy, in the Republican Youth had reported the same things and made the same proposal.

On July 19, Diem made an announcement in the Huen dialect but it was too brief and vague. He promised to solve this incident "like a family matter" and vaguely outlined a reconcialation. If he expected this message to have a soothing effect, it was not realized.

A month later on August 21, Ngo Dinh Nhu ordered a midnight raid on the pagodas of Saigon, Hue, and other coastal province cities. In Saigon, the operations were undertaken by the special forces of the president and by units of the comat police but were blamed by nhu on the regular army which had not participated in the operation.

More than 1,400 bonzes and other Buddhists were arrested and sent to concentration camps. This figure did not include an undetermined number of wounded and missing. Three bonzes, including the Venerable Thich Tri Quang, obtained shelter in the United States Embassy. The break between the government and the Buddhists was then on irrevocable.

This unfortunate attack by Nhu's personal forces caused great discredit on the government of Ngo Dinh Diem. The General Assembly of the United Nations appointed a commission of delegates from seven countries to visit Vietnam and investigate the Buddhist problem. They denounced the attack and other repressive measures as serious blows to the freedom of worship in Vietnam.

Emphasis Mine

Tran Van-Don later planned and carried a coup against President Diem on 1 November 1963. Diem and Nhu were both executed in the coup. On p.89 ibid., he writes:

The most important point that General [Ton That] Dinh and I had to make to President Diem was that unless the Buddhists could be appeased, the NLF would take advantage of the situation and further exploit the population. Diem and Nhu not only rejected our proposal, but blamed the generals for being demoralized and confused in facing this difficult situation. ...

Emphasis Mine

Comparing the Buddhists' protest in 1963 with the Rosenstrasse Protest, there is the following:

MetricRosenstrasseBuddhist
Year19431963
Number of protesters600 at any one time. 6,000 involved.Unknown. In the thousands.
Length of the protestA weekMay to August
Were the protestors were seen as being capable of causing social unrestYesYes
Reputation of the regimeThe reputation of the Nazi regime had suffered because of a military disaster (Stalingrad)The Diem government was very unpopular with the people over its repressive tactics.
What were the protestors' aims?They were simple and straightforward: Give us our husbands backGeneral and vague. They were against the various policies of the Diem government.
Did the protestors did not expand their demands to overthrow the regime?NoNo, but the government saw them as challenging it.
Was the regime leadership was divided over this issue?YesYes
Number of casualitiesNoneTen (10) dead by suicide
1,400+ arrested and placed in concentration camps
Unknown number were wounded and missing
Did protest achieve its aims?Yes. Their husbands were all released.Yes. The Diem government was overthrown on 1 November 1963 in a military coup and the prisoners were released with proclamation of religious freedom.

The violence in the Buddhists' protests came mainly from the government forces who saw the protestors as a threat to the governments. The other violence was done by the protestors to themselves through the flaming suicides.

Both of these protests occurred in the context of an ongoing war. Outside of the suicides, there was no violence coming from the protestors yet the government reacted with violence towards the protestors.


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2005/06/30

"Give us our husbands back!"

Gerry wants to discuss theorectical aspects of Pacifism. In his imagination. all things are possible. However, a Marxist must study reality. I recently found an article in "The Big Issue" (Issue #230 (06.06.05)) about a movie (Rosenstrasse) about a peaceful protest that got the Nazis to change their mind (Defiant Housewives by Rochelle Siemienowicz, p.32, ibid.).

In Resisting the Holocaust, Ruby Rohrlich (Ed), Berg, New York:2000, Nathan Stoltzfus writes in Protest and Silence: Resistance Histories in Post-War Germany: the Missing Case of Intermarried Germans (pp.152-153):

During the following fifteen months, as intermarried couples for the most part remained together even under the new terrors, the regime repeated its decision to defer intermarried Jews from the Final Solution "temporarily." The battle of wills between intermarried Germans and the Gestapo over the fate of intermarried Jews came to a dramatic climax on February 27, 1943, as Joseph Goebbels, the Party Gauleiter of Berlin, unleashed a massive surprise action intended to make Berlin "free of Jews." The Gestapo's code name for this massive surprise arrest, often known as the "Factory Action," was the "Final Roundup of the Jews," and for thousands, this was the beginning of the end. A battalion of SS men in uniforms with machine guns, along with local Gestapo agents and Berlin street policemen, fanned out across Berlin to capture the city's remaining Jews. Every truck in the city–some 300 in all–was requisitioned for the hunt. Goebbels, the Reich Minister charged with preventing public displays of dissent, hoped that the protests of intermarried Germans would be silenced by the "brute force" displayed in this arrest action.

As news of the massive arrest pulsed through the city German family members of arrested Jews began gathering on Rosenstrasse in front of the Jewish Community Center where intermarried Jews were imprisoned separately, in preparation for deportation. Gathering by the hundreds these "Aryans," who were overwhelmingly women, began to call out together "Give us our husbands back." Again and again, the police scattered the women with threats to shoot them down in the streets, but each time they advanced again, resumed their solidarity and called out together. Day by day the protest grew; as many as 600 or more came together at once, and as many as 6,000 had joined in by the protest's end. Normally people were afraid to show dissent, but on the street they knew they were among friends. "At first it was as if I was paralyzed," recalled Johanna Löwenstein de Witt. "It was a feeling of solidarity with one another that drove us on and gave us courage." Another protester recalled that she had begun her protest as an act of desperation but that as the protest continued, and as the Gestapo was unable to dispel it, she began to view the protest as a means of gaining the release of their husbands.

On March 6, following a week of noisy disturbances on Rosenstrasse, Goebbels relented, and ordered the release of all intermarried Jews and their children. Hitler gave his approval. For Propaganda Minister Goebbels success, based on mass conformity, lay in making it appear as though dissent did not exist, especially in Berlin. Releasing the intermarried Jews was the best way to dispel the open protest, visible not just to Germans but to foreign diplomats, journalists and spies in the German capital. To him the crowd of women calling out for Jewish family members was a "disagreeable scene."

Rosenstrasse is the only incident of mass German protest against the deportation of German Jews, and as a result of it at least 1,700 to 2,000 Jews survived. German "Aryans" married to Jews succeeded in rescuing thousands of Jews because of their own actions and identity, and not just due to circumstances. First, by the time of their desperate street protest, their non-compliance had already divided the Nazi leadership on how to handle intermarried Jews. Also, they had hard-earned reputations as persons willing to put their lives on the line; thus, unlike other Germans, they were guaranteed to cause the kind of social unrest the regime feared, especially following its first wartime debacle at Stalingrad just prior to the protest. Finally, they did not overplay their cards, demanding collectively just the release of their family members, and doing so in a daring, awkward street protest, rather than conspiratorially (and hopelessly) attempting to overthrow the regime as a whole with arms that would make them look to most Germans like criminals, in an area the regime was in any case greatly superior. So regardless of whether the success of intermarried German opposition in rescuing Jews is dated to Rosenstrasse or before, their non-compliance and protest produced a conflict between Nazi ideology and perceived policy options, influencing Hitler and the Gestapo to hesitate and repeatedly decide to "defer temporarily" deporting intermarried Jews–until the war ended.

Emphasis Mine

In summary,

  • The numbers were relatively small (600) at any one time
  • The protest lasted a short time (a week)
  • The protestors were seen as being capable of causing social unrest
  • The reputation of the Nazi regime had suffered because of a military disaster (Stalingrad)
  • The protestors' aims were simple and straightforward: Give us our husbands back
  • The protestors did not expand their demands to overthrow the Nazi regime
  • The Nazi leadership was divided over this issue

In other words, this protest was a trial of strength between the protestors and the Nazi leadership. It was not a quiet protest but it would appear to have been peaceful (this is not a contradiction). The protest was spontaneous without any leadership. The publicity surrounding it appears to be minimal (even after 60 years!). And most importantly, the protest achieved its aims without any lives being lost.

Even against the most brutal of regimes, peaceful protests by ordinary people can achieve results. But this was not achieved in a political vacuum. There was a crisis of confidence within the regime after the Stalingrad debacle. The protest was staged in the political centre of the regime making the impact more visible. And the protest did not seek to overthrow the regime. This last point, I believe, is important for planning peaceful protests.


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